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COMMENTS
A RELIGIOUS RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE:
HOBBY LOBBY AND “RELIGIOUS




The Supreme Court in its 2014 decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
broadly expanded so-called religious freedom protections in the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) by striking down a provision of the Af-
fordable Care Act requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage
for certain methods of contraception. In doing so, the Court opened the flood-
gates for employers to claim an exemption based upon any “sincerely held”
religious belief. Without inquiry into the sincerity of that belief, businesses and
corporations are free to adopt or assert beliefs that could lead to increased
discrimination against employees. This is especially troublesome for marginal-
ized groups like the LGBT community, which is already on the receiving end
of discrimination under the pretext of religious exemptions. To correct any
future misuse of these exemptions, Congress should amend RFRA to permit
courts to assess the belief being asserted and contrast it with the potential harm
if an exemption is allowed. The purpose of RFRA is to ease the burden faced
by people of faith forced to go against their religious beliefs if they obey a
certain statute. Easing this burden should focus on heady moral dilemmas, not
mere inconveniences. Amending RFRA can ensure it maintains its initial pur-
pose of protecting religious freedom, while not being used as a tool to perpetu-
ate discrimination.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2014, the Supreme Court exempted corporations from providing
“health-insurance coverage for methods of contraception that violate
the sincerely held religious beliefs of the companies’ owners.”1 The
Court’s decision of “startling breadth”2 was a “perfect storm”3 of the
“cultural whirlwind”4 that is religious freedom vis-à-vis governmental
statutory and administrative mandates.
This Comment discusses the background of religious freedom pro-
tections, how the Supreme Court applied the concept in Hobby
Lobby, and predicts that corporations will use similar arguments in
the future to discriminate against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans-
gender (“LGBT”) employees. It provides examples of ways that relig-
ious freedom arguments are already being used to discriminate against
LGBT individuals. It argues that the majority of the Court misapplied
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) and opened the
door to increased discrimination. Finally, it proposes amending RFRA
to protect LGBT individuals from future discrimination based on the
assertion of sincerely held religious beliefs by permitting courts to ex-
amine these beliefs.
I do not arrive at this conclusion at the expense or belittlement of
religious beliefs. Americans are free and should be free to practice
whatever religion they want. Thus, this debate is not about what an
individual believes or even what one religion prescribes. Rather, I rec-
ognize that some religious beliefs may conflict with current or future
anti-discrimination laws. When the practices of private religion and
1. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
2. Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
3. Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State, 38 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 103, 104 (2015).
4. Id.
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public entities like corporations intersect, this confluence demands
courts err toward a reading of statutory rights that safeguards the
rights of vulnerable individuals protected under the law. This is in
keeping with an expansive view of rights in the United States, of
which Archibald Cox remarked many years ago that “[o]nce loosed,
the idea of Equality is not easily cabined.”5
It is also important to note that while the term “religion” and the
LGBT community are juxtaposed in this Comment for illustrative
purposes, the two are not mutually exclusive. There are LGBT people
who are just as religiously devout as their straight counterparts. For
example, the Cathedral of Hope, located in Dallas, Texas, is known as
the “world’s largest gay church,” reaching thousands of gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and transgender individuals each week.6 Similarly, not all
straight individuals who belong to religious faiths are per se pro-dis-
crimination or anti-LGBT. In fact, people from religious backgrounds
have contributed significantly to expanding rights and protecting the
freedom of minority groups. In this multidimensional, complex world
in which we live, everyone should question broad labels and assertions
to ensure their intellectual authenticity. Where certain terms are used
as shorthand to describe a group or community in general (as in “re-
ligion” and the “LGBT community” here), it is essential to acknowl-
edge and state this prior to beginning any analysis.
II. BEFORE AND AFTER: THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
RESTORATION ACT OF 1993
A. The Run-Up to RFRA
Before examining the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,
it is important to look at the jurisprudence concerning religion that led
to its adoption. This historical overview provides an understanding of
the climate under which RFRA passed with overwhelming support
from both houses of Congress and both parties, something nearly
unimaginable today. The passage of RFRA was the result of several
decades of Supreme Court decisions, mostly ruling in favor of relig-
ious freedom among minority groups claiming mistreatment or
discrimination.
In 1963, a Seventh-day Adventist who refused to work Saturdays
(the Sabbath day for that religion) was fired and subsequently denied
unemployment benefits.7 After a state supreme court upheld the de-
nial of benefits, the Supreme Court stepped in. In a 7–2 opinion, the
5. Archibald Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of
Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 91 (1966).
6. World’s Largest Gay Church Joins United Church of Christ, CATHEDRAL OF
HOPE (Oct. 29, 2006), https://www2.cathedralofhope.com/united-church-of-christ
[http://perma.cc/UFD9-NFG9].
7. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399–401 (1963).
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Court in Sherbert v. Verner held that this restriction of benefits was a
significant burden on the employee’s ability to freely exercise her
faith8 and that there was no compelling state interest to justify this
infringement.9 Less than a decade later, Amish parents objected to a
state’s compulsory school attendance law because they believed high
school attendance violated their religion and way of life.10 Balancing
the interest of the state with the interest of the parents, the Court
granted an exemption to the Amish after the state failed “to show
with more particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compul-
sory education would be adversely affected.”11
But not all claims met the substantial burden or strict scrutiny tests
used to invalidate statutory provisions that conflicted with religious
liberties.12 In 1990, the Court ruled in Smith that when one’s religious
exercise was impaired by a general law not expressly aimed at relig-
ion, no constitutional claim existed.13 Here, the Court said an em-
ployee did not have an employment discrimination claim against his
employer based on a religious freedom claim. Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Scalia emphasized that the Sherbert test was limited and
inapplicable to wider criminal prohibitions of particular forms of
conduct.14
Liberal civil rights organizations reacted. The American Civil Liber-
ties Union (“ACLU”), Americans United for the Separation of
Church and State, People for the American Way, and Americans for
Democratic Action lobbied Congress to pass what would become
RFRA.15 In 1993, the bipartisan Senate version, sponsored by Sena-
tors Ted Kennedy (D-MA) and Orrin Hatch (R-UT), passed on a
97–3 vote.16 It went on to receive unanimous support in the House of
Representatives and was later signed by President Clinton. Its pur-
pose was “to reverse Smith and reinstate the Sherbert test.”17 Ironi-
cally, these same groups on the left that coalesced around the RFRA’s
passage are some of the leaders in opposition to the way the Supreme
Court interpreted it some twenty-plus years later.
8. See id. at 403–06.
9. See id. at 406–09.
10. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
11. Id. at 234–36.
12. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (concluding that the statutory
requirement that a state agency utilize Social Security numbers in administering the
programs in question does not violate the Free Exercise Clause); United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252 (1982) (declaring social security taxes were not unconstitutional after
they were objected to on religious grounds, i.e., receipt of public insurance benefits
and to payment of taxes to support public insurance funds).
13. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884–85 (1990).
14. Id.
15. Brett McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby 12 (Univ. Minn. Law
Sch. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 14-39, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2513380
[http://perma.cc/8SND-J7LU].
16. Id.
17. Id. at 13 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012)).
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B. RFRA and Beyond
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 prohibits the
“[g]overnment [from] substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability”
unless the Government “demonstrates that application of the burden
to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental in-
terest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compel-
ling governmental interest.”18 As amended by the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), RFRA covers
“any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a
system of religious belief.”19
Like all statutes, RFRA was a product of its time. The coalition
assembled—resulting in widespread, bipartisan support—viewed the
accommodation of religious values positively.20 RFRA likely “re-
flect[ed] the views of a majority that at the time of enactment had the
power to pass the law, and which majority did little to consider the
effect on those who did not share some core belief.”21 Others argue
that “it was hardly unforeseeable that these laws might conflict with
nondiscrimination statutes”22 and that “it is easy to miss that RFRA is
a ‘permissive’ accommodation—that is, a voluntary government ac-
commodation of religion that is not constitutionally required by the
Free Exercise Clause.”23
Regardless, issues surrounding RFRA became apparent quickly,
forcing courts to step in and Congress and the states to take action. Its
broad, undefined language—“substantial burden,” “compelling inter-
est,” and “least restrictive means”—created difficulties in interpreta-
tion: should its standards be read in a way that makes them
“deferential to government decisions in order to avoid excessively
broad coverage and serious problems of administrability[?]”24 That
these issues “have been problematic for both courts and scholars for
decades” “provides somewhat chilly comfort.”25 As one scholar put it,
“the Court is routinely criticized for the incoherence of its Religion
Clause jurisprudence.”26
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b) (2012).
19. § 2000cc-5(7)(A); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751, 2761–62 (2014).
20. McDonnell, supra note 15, at 12.
21. Id. at 47–48.
22. Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 171 (2014).
23. Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassel, RFRA Exemptions from
the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343, 348 (2014) (emphasis added).
24. Kent Greenawalt, The Hobby Lobby Case: Controversial Interpretive Tech-
niques and Standards of Application 9–10 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 14-421, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=25129
06 [http://perma.cc/W69R-KL9B].
25. McDonnell, supra note 15, at 48.
26. Horwitz, supra note 22, at 154.
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RFRA applied to federal and state statutes until 1997, when the
Supreme Court held it unconstitutional as applied to states in City of
Boerne v. Flores.27 After the Supreme Court declared RFRA did not
apply to the states, many states enacted their own laws exempting re-
ligious employers from compliance with public accommodation laws.28
At least twenty states have RFRA statutes or state constitutional pro-
visions.29 Only twenty-one states30 and the District of Columbia31
have laws prohibiting employment discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation, and only eighteen states prohibit such discrimination based
on gender identity.32 “These exemptions essentially condone a new
wave of discrimination that gives wedding vendors and other busi-
nesses license to refuse service to same-sex couples or [gay] pa-
trons.”33 As more courts strike down state bans on same-sex marriage,
proponents of these bans see “religious liberty” as the next weapon in
their arsenal against the LGBT community.
27. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534–35 (1997).
28. McDonnell, supra note 15, at 13; see also Terri R. Day et al., A Primer on
Hobby Lobby: For-Profit Corporate Entities’ Challenge to the HHS Mandate, Free
Exercise Rights, RFRA’s Scope, and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 55,
96–97 (2014).
29. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1493 to -1493.02
(2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b (2013); FLA. STAT. §§ 761.01–.05 (2010);
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 73-401 to -404 (2006); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1–99 (2011 &
Supp. 2015); H.B. 279, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13:5231–:5242 (2012); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 1.302–.307 (West Supp. 2014); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 28-22-1 to -5 (2012 & Supp. 2014); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51,
§§ 251–258 (2006); 71 PA. CONST. AND STAT. ANN. §§ 2401–2407 (West 2012); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 42-80.1-1 to -4 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-32-10 to -60 (2003); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 4-1-407 (2011); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 110.001–0.12
(2014); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63L-5-101 to -403 (West 2015); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 57-1
to -2.02 (2007).
30. These states are: California (CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12900, 12940 (West 2003 &
Supp. 2015)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-401 to -402 (2014)); Connecticut
(CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-51, -60 (West 2007 & Supp. 2015)); Delaware (DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 710 (2013 & Supp. 2014)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 378-1 (2010 & Supp. 2014)); Illinois (775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-101 to -102
(West 2011)); Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 216.1, .6 (West 2008)); Maine (ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4551–4552 (2007)); Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T
§ 20-606 (LexisNexis 2014)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (2013));
Minnesota (MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 (2012)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 613.310 (LexisNexis 2012)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:7
(2015)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-2, -23 (West 2013 & Supp. 2015)); New
Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-1, -4 (2012)); New York (N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 292,
296 (Consol. 1995 & Supp. 2015)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.030 (2013));
Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-5-1, -7 (2003)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 495 (2009)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030 (2008)); and Wisconsin
(WIS. STAT. § 111.31 (2002 & Supp. 2014)).
31. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1402.11 (West 2015).
32. The New Hampshire, New York, and Wisconsin statutes prohibiting discrimi-
nation in employment based on sexual orientation do not include explicit protections
for gender identity. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:7 (2015); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296
(McKinney 2015); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.31 (West 2015).
33. Day et al., supra note 28, at 56.
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Congress arguably strengthened religious exemptions in 2000 by
passing the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”), which added language to RFRA specifying that the ex-
ercise of religion covers “any exercise of religion, whether or not com-
pelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”34 Although this
appears to be an expansion, Justice Ginsberg believed this change
“did not concern who could bring claims but merely dealt with what
range of claims might succeed.”35 Regardless of how this change is
specifically defined by jurists or scholars, the overall trend over the
past two decades has been in favor of expanding claims based on relig-
ious exemption grounds.
III. BURWELL V. HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC.
The Supreme Court further broadened the expansion of religious
exemptions with its 2014 decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc. By challenging a provision of a 2010 law passed by Congress and
signed by the President, the plaintiffs sought relief based on a relig-
ious exemption claim under RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause. A
sharply divided Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in a 5–4 decision.
Since that time, myriad businesses and corporations have claimed re-
ligious exemptions consistent with the Hobby Lobby holding.
A. Facts and Procedural History
In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (“ACA”).36 Under the ACA, employers with fifty or more
full-time employees were required to provide health insurance that
met minimum coverage standards.37 This included “preventive care
and screenings” for female employees without “any cost sharing re-
quirements.”38 Congress did not specify what types of care this would
cover, leaving that up to regulations to be issued by the Department
of Health and Human Services (“HHS”).39
HHS promulgated regulations requiring nonexempt employers to
cover twenty contraceptive methods approved by the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”).40 The plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby objected to
four of these contraceptives, which inhibit a fertilized egg from attach-
ing to the uterus, deeming them “abortifacients”—something that
34. McDonnell, supra note 15, at 52 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 20000cc-5(7)(A) (2012)).
35. Greenawalt, supra note 24, at 14–15 (emphasis added) (citing Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2788–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
36. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119–1025 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
37. McDonnell, supra note 15, at 13.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (2012).
39. McDonnell, supra note 15, at 13–14.
40. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78
Fed. Reg. 39,870 (July 2, 2013) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713(a)(iv)).
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causes an abortion.41 The FDA’s description of the drugs never men-
tions “abortifacient” or “abortion”42 and many scientists objected to
the drugs being described as inducing abortion.
Under HHS regulations, religious employers such as churches, as
well as religious nonprofit organizations with religious objections, are
exempt from this requirement.43 By exempting these religious groups
that have historically enjoyed special treatment under the law, HHS
and the Obama administration understood the religious liberty fears
of such groups. This exemption addressed those concerns while re-
quiring non-religious groups, such as for-profit corporations, to ad-
here to the ACA.44
Thus, this would not be an issue if the group at issue was the
“Church of Hobby Lobby” or “Hobby Lobby Charities.” Then, the
insurance company would have to exclude contraceptive coverage
while providing employees access to services without imposing any
cost-sharing requirements. But Hobby Lobby Stores, Incorporated is a
closely held corporation controlled by the Green family.45
The Greens brought suit, along with two other similar corporate en-
tities, in what was consolidated by the Supreme Court into Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., claiming it was their sincere Christian be-
lief that life begins at conception and that to comply with the ACA’s
contraceptive mandate would violate their religion. They sued HHS
(and other federal officials and agencies, which were all consolidated)
under RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause. They sought to enjoin the
portion of the mandate requiring coverage for the four contraceptives
to which they objected.
Assessing the scope of the claim during oral arguments, Justice
Sotomayor asked whether the Greens’ religious objection applied
only to contraceptives, or if it included other “items like blood trans-
fusion[s], vaccines[ ] . . . [or] products made of pork.”46 There were
41. Cathy Lynn Grossman, What’s Abortifacient? Disputes over Birth Control Fuel





43. Day et al., supra note 28; Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807
(2014) (“Any religious nonprofit is also exempt [from the HHS Mandate] as long as it
signs a form certifying that it is a religious nonprofit that objects to the provision of
contraceptive services, and provides a copy of that form to its insurance issuer or
third-party administrator.”).
44. The Supreme Court has had two opportunities to invalidate part of the ACA.
Both times it has upheld the law. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); Nat’l Fed’n
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
45. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013),
aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
46. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 12-345, 13-356), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/13-354_3ebh.pdf [http://perma.cc/MJ8X-HYNG].
2015] A RELIGIOUS RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE 403
additional concerns: could “any claim . . . that has a religious basis
[allow] an employer [to] preclude the use of those items as well?”47
“Does the creation of the exemption relieve me from paying taxes
when I have a sincere religious belief that taxes are immoral?”48
Of the twenty FDA-approved contraceptives, the Hobby Lobby
plaintiffs objected to only four.49 Nevertheless, “[o]ver 100 lawsuits
have been filed in federal court challenging the ACA’s birth control
coverage benefit.”50 For example, the Hahn family, owners of for-
profit Conestoga Wood Specialties, brought a claim similar to the
Greens.51 That claim was rejected by the district court and the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals.52 Both courts held that a for-profit corpora-
tion could not “engage in religious exercise under the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment and the RFRA” and that the mandate
did not impose any requirements on the Hahns in their personal
capacity.53
The Greens also lost in district court, but the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed that decision.54 The court held that the Greens’
businesses are “persons” under RFRA, that the Greens “established a
likelihood of success that their rights under this statute are substan-
tially burdened by the contraceptive-coverage requirement,”55 and
that HHS “has not shown a narrowly tailored compelling interest to
justify this burden.”56 Alternatively, the court held that HHS had not
proved that the mandate was the “least restrictive means” of further-
ing a compelling governmental interest.57
B. Holdings
A 5–4 majority of the Court agreed with the Greens. It held that
RFRA applies to regulations for closely held for-profits and that the
ACA’s contraceptive mandate substantially burdens the exercise of
religion.58
47. Id. at 4.
48. Id. at 85.
49. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1124–25.
50. Challenges to the Birth Control Coverage Benefit, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR.,
http://www.nwlc.org/challenges-birth-control-coverage-benefit [http://perma.cc/QG
V2-BLQ8].
51. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 380 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
52. Id. at 381.
53. Id.
54. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1114.
55. Id. at 1121, 1129.
56. Id. at 1128.
57. Id. at 1144.
58. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759, 2775 (2014).
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1. RFRA Applies to Regulations of Closely Held For-Profits
To extend RFRA to corporations, the majority employed the Dic-
tionary Act, which defines “person” as generally used in federal stat-
utes. Under the Act, “the wor[d] ‘person’ . . . include[s] corporations,
companies, association[s], firms, partnerships, society, and joint stock
companies, as well as individuals.”59
In a strong dissent, Justice Ginsberg argued in part that one of the
primary benefits of incorporation is that “shareholders are not respon-
sible for the liabilities of the corporation.”60 This is “one of the key
benefits of the corporate form.”61 Hobby Lobby was trying to have it
both ways—relying on its incorporation to shield itself from liability
while invoking its corporate personhood to exempt itself from a provi-
sion of the health care law.62 The majority rejected an assertion by
Justice Ginsberg that, by rejecting an amendment to the 2012 Wo-
men’s Health Amendment (which expanded the ACA) that would
have “broadly exempt[ed] claims of conscience,” Congress “showed
an intention to limit what entities could bring claims.”63
2. The Contraceptive Mandate Substantially Burdens
Exercise of Religion
The majority accepted the sincerely held belief of the Greens
against providing contraceptive coverage for employees. To answer
whether the contraceptive mandate substantially burdens the exercise
of Hobby Lobby’s religion in the affirmative, the majority relied on
what they considered “a better alternative accommodation.”64 HHS
has already created an alternative accommodation for genuinely relig-
ious employers like churches and religious nonprofits: an employer
required to provide contraceptive coverage under the ACA can object
and exclude coverage of contraceptives.65 Insurance companies would
then pick up the cost because the cost of contraceptives is less than the
59. McDonnell, supra note 15, at 17 (third alteration added) (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)) (discussing Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. at 2768).
60. Id. at 22 (citing Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Profes-
sors in Support of Petitioners at 6–8, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356)); see also Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at
2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“By incorporating a business, however, an individual
separates herself from the entity and escapes personal responsibility for the entity’s
obligations.”).
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in
Support of Petitioners at 13–16, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356)).
63. Greenawalt, supra note 24, at 15 (discussing Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. at 2788–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) and id. at 2775 n.30 (majority opinion)).
64. McDonnell, supra note 15, at 56 (discussing Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. at 2780–82).
65. Id. at 57 (citing Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2782).
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“expected savings in reduced services for pregnant women” realized
by the insurance company.66
Justice Kennedy, the deciding vote in striking down the contracep-
tive mandate, wrote a concurrence centered on the better alternative
accommodation approach,67 which “works by requiring insurance
companies to cover, without cost sharing, contraception coverage for
female employees who wish it.”68 His focus was “on how well this ac-
commodation balances all competing interests, and on how narrow it
is and how much tougher the questions become where insurers are not
willing to step into the gap.”69 For Kennedy, accommodating the gov-
ernment’s interest in ensuring women have access to contraceptives
was not difficult:
[T]his is not a case where it can be established that it is difficult to
accommodate the government’s interest, and in fact the mechanism
for doing so is already in place. . . .
. . . [T]his existing model, designed precisely for this problem, might
well suffice to distinguish the instant case from many others in
which it is more difficult and expensive to accommodate a govern-
mental program to countless religious claims based on an alleged
statutory right of free exercise.70
C. Implications
Most people do not think of “corporations as persons exercising re-
ligion.”71 It would be hard to find a church large enough to hold 600-
plus Hobby Lobby stores.72 After the Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens
United73—allowing unlimited funds to flow to candidates from corpo-
rations—perhaps Hobby Lobby should not have come as a shock. The
Roberts Court has consistently ruled on the side of increased rights
for corporations.74 While the majority can point to the text of its opin-
ion to make the claim that the decision was limited, subsequent action
by the Court reveals that to be false.75 Instead, some hypothetical ex-
pansive scenarios posited by the dissenting justices are already taking
place.
66. Id.
67. See McDonnell, supra note 15, at 56–57 (citing Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134
S. Ct. at 2786–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
68. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
69. McDonnell, supra note 15, at 58 (citing Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at
2786–87).
70. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2786–87.
71. Greenawalt, supra note 24, at 17.
72. Our Company, HOBBY LOBBY STORES, http://www.hobbylobby.com/stores/
stores.cfm [http://perma.cc/P3Z5-RN5L].
73. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
74. See McDonnell, supra note 15, at 3 (“[Hobby Lobby] is seen as part of an
ongoing movement by the Court’s conservative majority to tilt the playing field to-
wards corporations.”).
75. See infra Section III.C.3.
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1. Majority
The majority claimed the “decision should not be understood to
hold that an insurance-coverage mandate must necessarily fall if it
conflicts with an employer’s religious beliefs.”76 Responding to ques-
tions asked by some members of the Court at oral arguments, the ma-
jority stated that “[o]ther coverage requirements, such as
immunizations, may be supported by different interests (for example,
the need to combat the spread of infectious diseases) and may involve
different arguments about the least restrictive means of providing
them.”77 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence emphasizes that this accom-
modation is limited and that the issue would be more difficult if insur-
ers were not willing to pay for the expense caused by the exemption.78
Given the challenges being brought by religious employers, Justice
Kennedy and his colleagues may be answering this question sooner
than later.
2. Dissent
The dissent favored taking an objective approach, finding the link
between the religious belief and the ACA requirement “too attenu-
ated to rank as substantial.”79 It treated the question of attenuation as
an objective matter of law80: the further disconnected the link be-
tween religious belief and statutory requirement, the more likely it is
to be found too attenuated and not substantial. The gap between the
owners of Hobby Lobby and the employee’s actual use of the contra-
ception required by the ACA was simply too disconnected to be a
substantial burden.81
Justice Ginsberg also questioned whether RFRA would exempt
commercial businesses that wanted to discriminate based on race, re-
ligion, sex, or sexual orientation on religious grounds.82 The majority’s
76. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014).
77. Id.
78. McDonnell, supra note 15, at 58 (citing Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at
2786–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
79. Id. at 51 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134
S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
80. Id.
81. Greenawalt, supra note 24, at 24.
82. Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemp-
tions, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35, 93 (2015); see also Berg, supra note 3, at 128–29
(citing Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2804–05 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 256 F. Supp. 941, 945 (D.S.C. 1966) (owner
of restaurant chain refused to serve black patrons based on his religious beliefs oppos-
ing racial integration), aff’d in relevant part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 377
F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), aff’d and modified on other grounds, 390 U.S. 400 (1968); In
re Minnesota ex rel. McClure, 370 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Minn. 1985) (born-again Chris-
tians who owned closely held, for-profit health clubs believed that the Bible pro-
scribed hiring or retaining an “individua[l] living with but not married to a person of
the opposite sex,” “a young, single woman working without her father’s consent or a
married woman working without her husband’s consent,” and any person “antagonis-
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response to this question only mentioned discrimination based on
race: “The Government has a compelling interest in providing an
equal opportunity to participate in the work–force without regard to
race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely tailored to
achieve that critical goal.”83 By not addressing other grounds for dis-
crimination, the possibility remains that the majority may consider
such grounds appropriate for exemption under RFRA.84 If nothing
else, refusing to respond to all the suggested rationales for potential
exemptions sends a message to would-be challengers: proceed.
3. Subsequent Cases
Only three days after Hobby Lobby, the Court further expanded its
reach by granting a preliminary injunction in Wheaton College v.
Burwell.85 Injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy.”86 Granting
“injunctive relief before deciding the merits of a petitioner’s claim re-
quires a showing that the right to relief, on the merits, is ‘indisputably
clear.’”87 Here, a religious, nonprofit, liberal arts college in Illinois
argued that simply filing a form to opt out of the contraceptive cover-
age mandate would substantially burden its religious exercise. The
Court agreed, despite concluding earlier in that week that the chal-
lenged accommodation “constitutes an alternative that achieves all of
the Government’s aims while providing greater respect for religious
liberty.”88 The dissenting Justices in Hobby Lobby denounced the ma-
jority for its disregard of precedent established just three days prior
and accused it of “undermin[ing] the confidence of this institution”89:
Those who are bound by our decisions usually believe they can take
us at our word. Not so today. After expressly relying on the availa-
bility of the religious-nonprofit accommodation to hold that the
contraceptive coverage requirement violates RFRA as applied to
closely held for-profit corporations, the Court now, as the dissent in
Hobby Lobby feared it might, retreats from that position.90
tic to the Bible,” including “fornicators and homosexuals”) (internal quotations omit-
ted), appeal dismissed, 478 U.S. 1015 (1986); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309
P.3d 53, 60 (N.M. 2014))).
83. Lupu, supra note 82, at 93 & n.292 (discussing and quoting Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2783 (majority opinion)).
84. Id. at 93.
85. Berg, supra note 3, at 126 n.120; see Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806
(2014).
86. Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2810 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
87. Day et al., supra note 28, at 104 (citing Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2808
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting)).
88. Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2808 (quoting Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
at 2759).
89. Id. (citing Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2801–02 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting)).
90. Id. (citation omitted) (citing Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2801–02
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
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If the foundation of Hobby Lobby majority and concurrence was
the pre-existing governmental accommodation, that the majority of
the Court in Wheaton concluded that the accommodation likely vio-
lated RFRA reduced its previous opinion to “smoke and mirrors.”91
Indeed, Wheaton went even further than Hobby Lobby.92 It claimed
its religious freedom was violated because a third party had to comply
with the HHS mandate in its place.93 As Justice Sotomayor stated,
“[n]ot every sincerely felt ‘burden’ is a ‘substantial’ one, and it is for
courts, not litigants, to identify which are.”94 One should note that
Justice Breyer, in the Hobby Lobby minority, joined in the majority in
Wheaton.
New Mexico has both a state version of RFRA and a Human Rights
Act (“NMHRA”), a nondiscrimination ordinance prohibiting discrim-
ination in places of public accommodation. In Elane Photography v.
Willock,95 the plaintiff contacted a photography studio to get a pho-
tographer for her wedding to another woman. Owners objected “as a
matter of conscious to creating pictures or books that will tell stories
or convey messages contrary to their deeply held religious beliefs . . .
[because they believed] marriage is the union of a man and a wo-
man.”96 After Elane Photography studio refused to photograph the
wedding of a same-sex couple, the couple brought a claim under NM-
HRA. Elane claimed an exemption under the statute, asserting that
religious organizations can decline same-sex couples as customers. It
also claimed that being a commercial, for-profit entity did not dimin-
ish its First Amendment rights, and the Commission’s enforcement of
the NMHRA here constituted unlawfully compelled speech in viola-
tion of those rights.97 “[T]he New Mexico Human Rights Commission
. . . held that Elane Photography had engaged in an illegal act of sex-
ual orientation discrimination by a public accommodation in violation
of the New Mexico Human Rights Act . . . .”98 The Supreme Court of
New Mexico acknowledged “[e]xemptions for religious organizations
are common in a wide variety of laws, and they reflect the attempts of
the Legislature to respect free exercise rights by reducing legal bur-
dens on religion.”99 Nevertheless, the court held that the photography
studio’s reading of the statutory exception was overly broad.100 The
91. Day et al., supra note 28, at 104.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2812.
95. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014).
96. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, 6, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock,
134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014) (No. 13–585), 2013 WL 6002201.
97. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2009 WL 8747805 (N.M. Dist. Dec. 11,
2009).
98. Day et al., supra note 28, at 93.
99. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 75 (N.M. 2013).
100. Id. at 74–75.
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owners of the photography studio appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court, which denied certiorari.101
The plaintiffs against whom Elane discriminated are hardly alone.
Indeed, Hobby Lobby has increased litigation by would-be customers
who have pushed back against businesses that refused to serve them.
A gay couple in Washington sued a florist who refused to provide
flowers for their commitment ceremony.102 An LGBT organization
sued a Christian-owned t-shirt company that refused to print shirts
because it disagreed with the organization’s message.103 And a couple
sued a bakery for refusing to sell them a wedding cake because of
their sexual orientation.104 These are just a few examples of recent
court cases.
This issue is likely to come up in the context of government contrac-
tors, particularly after the President’s 2014 amendment to a long-
standing executive order concerning nondiscrimination on the part of
federal government contractors. Under the amendment, contractors
are now prohibited from discriminating in employment on the basis of
sexual orientation or gender identity.105 Current or potential federal
contractors could arguably refuse to hire someone who is openly
LGBT or refuse to provide equal health benefits to a same-sex
spouse, citing religious reasons.106 The federal government has con-
tracts with an enormous number of businesses and corporations, so
the reach of this new nondiscrimination provision cannot be
underestimated.
The question of recognition of same-sex marriage and religious be-
liefs may also come up under an amendment to the Family and Medi-
cal Leave Act (“FMLA”)107 if an employer objected to an employee’s
request for leave to take care of a same-sex spouse on religious
grounds. In June 2014, the U.S. Department of Labor proposed a rule
that would revise the definition of “spouse” in FMLA in light of the
Supreme Court’s 2013 decision on same-sex marriage in United States
v. Windsor.108 The new rule would amend the definition of spouse and
provide FMLA leave for an employee in a same-sex marriage valid in
the state in which it was celebrated. This requirement applies regard-
101. Elane Photography, 134 S. Ct. at 1787.
102. State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No. 13-2-00871-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. filed Feb.
18, 2015).
103. Baker v. Hands On Originals, Inc., No. 03-12-3135 (Lexington-Fayette Urban
Cty. Human Rights Comm’n filed Nov. 13, 2012), rev’d sub. nom. Hands On Origi-
nals, Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Human Rights Comm’n, No. 14-CI-04474
(Fayette Cir. Ct., Civ. 3d Div. Apr. 27, 2015).
104. Craig v. Masterpiece CakeShop, Inc., No. CR 2013-0008 (Colo. Admin. Ct.
Dec. 6, 2013).
105. Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (July 21, 2014).
106. Id.
107. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 79 Fed. Reg. 36,445 (June 27,
2014) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 825.102).
108. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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less of whether the state of residence recognizes the validity of the
marriage. So, for example, a same-sex employee legally married in
California (where same-sex marriage is legal) but residing in Texas
(where same-sex marriage is illegal and not recognized) could request
leave under FMLA to take care of his or her spouse. FMLA provides
for unpaid leave, so that removes one argument as to the burden faced
by the employer. But as seen recently, the Court either makes no in-
quiry into how substantial that burden had to be (Hobby Lobby) or
recognizes even a slight inconvenience as amounting to a burden
(Wheaton College). Both lines of reasoning distort RFRA’s purpose
and the interests it was intended to protect.
IV. “SUBSTANTIAL BURDENS” ON “SINCERELY HELD BELIEFS”?
The purpose of RFRA is to ease the burden faced by people of faith
forced to compromise their religious beliefs if they comply with a cer-
tain statute. Easing this burden should focus on heady moral dilem-
mas, not just mere inconveniences. Without courts examining the
sincerity of the purported religious beliefs of the plaintiffs claiming
protection under RFRA, the potential for abuse increases.109
The majority takes a subjective approach to the question of substan-
tial burdens on sincerely held beliefs: if a corporation says it is a sub-
stantial burden, it is a substantial burden. No judicial inquiry is
required. Essentially, this amounts to a “grant of exemption without
real examination.”110 This approach provides complete deference to
the corporation without even a passing inquiry into the alleged bur-
den. It should be noted that Hobby Lobby’s retirement plan “holds
$73 million in mutual funds with investments in companies that make
abortion drugs.”111 Puzzlingly, some of the companies that Hobby
Lobby invests in manufacture the same contraceptives to which the
company now objects.112
The dissent suggests taking an objective approach, drawing the line
where the connection between burden and belief is “too attenuated to
rank as substantial.”113 Of course, courts would still have to draw a
line somewhere, but this approach would at least require more than a
mere assertion by a corporation with regard to its sincerely held relig-
ious beliefs.
109. McDonnell, supra note 15, at 50.
110. Greenawalt, supra note 24, at 36.
111. Day et al., supra note 28, at 97 (quoting Gail Sullivan, Antiabortion Company
Hobby Lobby Reportedly Invests Retirement Funds in Abortion Drugs, WASH. POST




113. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2799 (2014).
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A. Shift over Two Decades
The cultural and political landscapes have changed since RFRA
passed in 1993. With these changes, the beneficiaries of RFRA have
also shifted. More “mainstream” religious organizations objected to
the contraceptive coverage provision in the ACA. Similarly, many
large religious organizations may object to enacted or proposed anti-
gay discrimination laws. The 1993 provisions protected religious
groups outside the mainstream, but today are being used by powerful
religious voices to protest laws and policies with which they disagree.
This is part of an overall trend of attempting to nullify secular law by
claiming attacks on religion, with some going as far as to accuse the
President of waging a “war on religion.”114
Others see similarities in the two groups, “compar[ing] religious
conservatives with gays and lesbians and argu[ing] that both groups
should be protected. Because the two groups ‘are each viewed as evil
by a substantial portion of the population, each is subject to substan-
tial risks of intolerant and unjustifiably burdensome regulation.’”115
Supporters of the decision in Hobby Lobby should question how they
would react to intolerance directed toward them under the guise of a
sincerely held religious belief. Religious conservatives are not a nu-
merical majority in this country, yet their ideology pervades American
politics and policy.116 But religious conservatives could see a circum-
stance in the not-too-distant future when someone is asserting a right
to discriminate against a belief they hold close. Demographics and at-
titudes are changing, making it possible that those in positions of con-
trol and power today will not have the same status one day.
A 2013 Pew Research Center survey found that, for the first time, a
majority (51%) of Americans support same-sex marriage.117 Yet in
the same survey, 45% of Americans were found to view homosexual-
114. Gedicks & Van Tassel, supra note 23, at 383 (citing PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY &
GEORGE NEUMAYR, NO HIGHER POWER: OBAMA’S WAR ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
(2012); Bill Donohue, Obama’s War on Religion, CATALYST (Oct. 2012), http://www
.catholicleague.org/obamas-war-on-religion-2/ [http://perma.cc/XD8A-NQX5]; and
Rachel Weiner, Romney: Obama Waging ‘War on Religion,’ WASH. POST (Aug. 9,
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/romney-obama-waging-war-
on-religion/2012/08/09/192c4e02-e213-11e1-a25e-15067bb31849_blog.html [http://per
ma.cc/E5UG-6PEX] (“During the Republican primary, when the Health and Human
Services Department mandated that most insurance cover contraception without a co-
pay, charges of a war on religion were commonplace.”)).
115. Berg, supra note 3, at 113 (quoting Douglas Laycock & Thomas C. Berg, Pro-
tecting Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty, 99 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 5 (2013),
http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/virginialawreview.org/files/LaycockBerg.pdf
[http://perma.cc/BA6Z-GS4N]).
116. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE RIGHT NATION:
CONSERVATIVE POWER IN AMERICA 15–16 (2004).
117. In Gay Marriage Debate, Both Supporters and Opponents See Legal Recogni-
tion as ‘Inevitable,’ PEW RES. CTR. (June 6, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/
06/06/in-gay-marriage-debate-both-supporters-and-opponents-see-legal-recognition-
as-inevitable/ [http://perma.cc/ZYG9-TPBJ].
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ity as a sin, and roughly half (52%) cited moral objections, religious
conflicts, or the Bible to justify their opposition to gay people.118
Among Americans who attend religious services regularly, two-thirds
say homosexuality conflicts with their religion.119 It should come as no
surprise, then, that 58% of the LGBT community report being victims
of discrimination because of sexual orientation or gender identity.120
Religion and sexual orientation are indelibly tied to one’s personal
identity, and no one has suggested that the Hobby Lobby owners
change their religious beliefs.121 Likewise, courts should protect
LGBT employees from assertions that they “change” their sexual ori-
entation. Such thinking is already present in biased attitudes of health
professionals—often rooted in religious views—that contribute to the
persistent health disparities affecting the LGBT community.122
B. Contraceptive-like Method to Prevent HIV
Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (“PrEP”) is a new scientific advancement
in the prevention of human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”)123 that
may give rise to religious exemption claims. Recent FDA approval of
tenofovir-emtricitabine for the prevention of HIV prescribes a com-
mon antiretroviral drug used to treat HIV/AIDS to individuals who
are HIV-negative to prevent transmission of the virus. The medication,
taken once daily, effectively protects the HIV-negative individual
should he or she become exposed to HIV through sexual contact. In
one study, PrEP, “used in combination with condoms and counseling
reduced HIV transmission by 96.4%.”124 The public health implica-
tions of this new prevention method are significant, but there are chal-
lenges to its use and acceptance, not the least of which is the adoption
by businesses or companies that may disagree with the private behav-
ior (i.e., sex) of its employees. This should sound all too familiar . . .125
But unlike contraception, which is relatively inexpensive and poses
little financial burden to the employer, the cost of PrEP is significant
118. Id.




121. Berg, supra note 3, at 13–14 (“Both sexual orientation and religion are impor-
tant to personal identity, and consequently either impossible to change, or very diffi-
cult to change without substantial costs to one’s sense of integrity.”).
122. See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, THE HEALTH OF LESBIAN,
GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER PEOPLE: BUILDING A FOUNDATION FOR BET-
TER UNDERSTANDING (2011).
123. PrEP, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 25, 2015), http:/
/www.cdc.gov/hiv/basics/prep.html [http://perma.cc/9W4M-SFQN].
124. Myron S. Cohen et al., Antiretroviral Treatment of HIV-1 Prevents Transmis-
sion of HIV-1: Where Do We Go from Here?, 382 LANCET 1515, 1515 (2013).
125. See Julie E. Myers & Kent A. Sepkowitz, A Pill for HIV Prevention: Déjà Vu
All Over Again?, 56 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1604 (2013).
2015] A RELIGIOUS RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE 413
(albeit not when compared to the cost of treating someone diagnosed
with HIV/AIDS, which most insurances already cover). There are also
barriers to accessing PrEP, as knowledge of this newer prevention
method has yet to be diffused throughout the communities that could
most benefit from its use.126
When first introduced, contraceptives were not viewed as favorably
as they are today. Opponents were concerned that access to contra-
ception would encourage promiscuity and decrease morality.127 The
same can be said of PrEP detractors today. Blind to the fact that HIV
continues to spread despite existing messages concerning HIV preven-
tion, individuals and groups opposing PrEP worry that it will decrease
condom use and increase casual sex. Similar arguments against contra-
ception faded over time, and it is likely that this will also occur as
more people are educated on PrEP and its usage. Its incredible suc-
cess rate, when combined with other risk reduction strategies, alone is
cause for the support of PrEP, regardless of any personal feelings to-
ward its morality. Similarly, regardless of one’s views on the morality
of female contraceptives, even their biggest opponents are reluctant to
make claims against their efficacy.
Public opinion on contraception is overwhelmingly positive, with
the vast majority of females using it at some point during their life-
time. Still, companies like Hobby Lobby were allowed to refuse to
cover its use because of their religious beliefs. So when considering a
medication to prevent HIV—a sexually transmitted virus, with the
majority of those who become infected with it being men who have
sex with men—it is not a stretch of the imagination to think an em-
ployer may raise an objection to such coverage because it sincerely
believes being gay is wrong or unnatural. While approximately half of
the population likely has had a personal encounter with contraception
that may influence one’s views on its morality,128 half the population is
certainly not gay.129
126. See Michael Horberg & Brian Raymond, Financial Policy Issues for HIV Pre-
Exposure Prophylaxis: Cost and Access to Insurance, 44 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED.
S125, S125 (2013).
127. See BERNARD ASBELL, THE PILL: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE DRUG THAT
CHANGED THE WORLD (1995).
128. Females make up 50.8% of the U.S. population. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
C2010BR-03, 2010 CENSUS BRIEFS: AGE AND SEX COMPOSITION: 2010 (2011), http://
www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf  [http://perma.cc/9REC-MA77].
“More than 99% of women 15–44 years of age who have ever had sexual intercourse
with a male . . . have used at least one contraceptive method.” Nat’l Ctr. for Health
Statistics, Use of Contraception in the United States: 1982–2008, 23 VITAL & HEALTH
STATISTICS No. 29, 1 (2010), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_029.pdf
[http://perma.cc/EZ3V-PLFC].
129. The Williams Institute at UCLA School of Law compared four large, national,
population-based surveys that estimate between 2.2% and 4.0%, or between 5.2 mil-
lion and 9.5 million, of U.S. adults identify as LGB or LGBT. Gary J. Gates, LGBT
Demographics: Comparisons among Population-Based Surveys, WILLIAMS INST.,
414 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3
Regardless of whether an employer has personal experience with
contraceptives because she is female, or can sympathize with the
LGBT community because he is gay, businesses ultimately pick up the
costs distributed across society. Unintended pregnancies and HIV in-
fections impose financial burdens on individuals, businesses, and cor-
porations that pay taxes. So, like it or not, employers will pay one way
or another.
V. PROTECTING LGBT EMPLOYEES
The implications of the Hobby Lobby decision have the potential to
disproportionately impact the LGBT community, which is already
marginalized and faces discrimination on a daily basis. In expanding
exemptions for religious beliefs, the Court left the LGBT community
more vulnerable to attack by individuals, businesses, and corporations
who would use religion as a weapon. The solution is to amend RFRA
to better protect the rights of the LGBT community while balancing
exemptions for religious beliefs.
A. Hobby Lobby Opened the Door, Hitting the LGBT
Community in the Face
“The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against
any governmental regulation of religious beliefs . . . .”130 The Hobby
Lobby majority swung that door wide open without a cursory inquiry
as to who was standing on the other side.
Traditionally, the Court has upheld federal laws “afford[ing] consti-
tutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procrea-
tion, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education.”131 Indeed, the Court has held these decisions as being
among “the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in
a lifetime.”132 The judiciary has been a successful venue to not only
challenge interconnected legal and social stigmas but to grow move-
ment support for the targeted group.133 Post-Hobby Lobby, this is no
longer the case.
Instead, the majority “open[ed] the door to similar denials of equal
compensation, health care access, and other equitable treatment for
UCLA SCH. L. (2014), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/lgbt-
demogs-sep-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/5VM9-6EFX].
130. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).
131. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (citing Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
132. Id. at 578 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
133. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements
and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 422 (2001) (“[C]ourts as much as legislatures
have been avenues for the [Identity-Based Social Movement] to contest its intercon-
nected legal and social stigmas. Most surprisingly, legal forums and actors provided
backdrop for many of the dramatic events that helped turn a nascent reform move-
ment into a mass social movement.”).
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LGBT people, persons with HIV, and anyone else whose family life or
health need diverges from their employers’ religious convictions.”134
It remains to be seen just how far denials of equitable treatment under
the law will be stretched under the guise of religion. Can religious
business owners who object to blood transfusions be exempted from
covering such medical services for their employees?135 What about
people of faith who, for centuries, have objected to childhood vaccina-
tions?136 Or those who would “selectively exclude coverage for ‘sinful’
medications that control pain, alleviate depression, or manage
HIV[?]”137 These outstanding questions, the answers to which could
affect the health and well-being of millions of Americans, necessitate
a change in RFRA.
B. Amend RFRA
Congress should amend RFRA to reemphasize its application is
permissive, not mandatory. This would empower courts to look more
carefully at the sincerity of a religious belief, especially when such a
belief results in cost-savings to the business. In such cases, a business
may have a financial motivation more so than a religious one. While
this was not the case in Hobby Lobby—“insurance coverage should
be no cheaper if the contraceptive coverage is dropped”138—it is not
difficult to imagine a company faced with covering PrEP (at a cost of
over $1,000 per month per person) suddenly discovering a “sincerely
held belief” against gay and lesbian individuals.
Congress can protect religious freedom while preserving minority
rights by adopting an “inter-subjective approach” that “would look
not just to sincerity, but also ask how important a particular belief is
within the relevant belief system.”139 Currently, such an amendment is
not possible because of RLUIPA, which specifies that the exercise of
religion covers “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by,
or central to, a system of religious belief.”140 Thus, RLUIPA would
need to be amended as well.
As a practical matter, given the current ideological composition of
Congress, it is unlikely that any amendment would gain much momen-
134. Brief of Amici Curiae Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. et al.
in Support of the Government at 28, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae Lambda Legal et
al.].
135. J. Lowell Dixon & M. Gene Smalley, Jehovah’s Witnesses: The Surgical/Ethical
Challenge, 246 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 2471 (1981).
136. See, e.g., Andrew Dickson White, Theological Opposition to Inoculation, Vac-
cination, and the Use of Anesthetics, in A HISTORY OF THE WARFARE OF SCIENCE
WITH TECHNOLOGY IN CHRISTENDOM (1898), http://abob.libs.uga.edu/bobk/whitem10
.html [http://perma.cc/7XRH-MG7F].
137. Brief of Amici Curiae Lambda Legal et al., supra note 134, at 30.
138. McDonnell, supra note 15, at 52.
139. Id. at 51.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 20000cc-5(7)(A) (2012).
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tum or substantial support, much less come anywhere close to the
near-unanimous passage of RFRA in the 1993 Congress. But current
legislators could learn from history: the groups most active in pushing
for passage of the 1993 RFRA were ideologically left of center. These
groups’ previous support for religious freedom for religious minorities
backfired in the eyes of many who view Hobby Lobby as incorrectly
decided or who are sympathetic to the dissent’s approach to religious
accommodations. Two decades later, the groups making the religious
liberty claims are different. Two decades from now, the players may
be reversed, and individuals with similar ideologies to the justices in
the majority in Hobby Lobby may be butting up against religious free-
dom arguments made by their employers. When the proverbial shoe is
on the other foot, attitudes toward amending RFRA may be different.
Now is the time to amend its language so courts can better apply it in
the future, regardless of who is claiming an exemption under RFRA
and who is claiming harm by the purported exemption.
A proper balance is possible if people on both sides of the debate
imagine their particular group or belief as being in the minority, under
attack by a majority armed with religion, and with a judiciary unwill-
ing to take even a slightly critical look at that majority’s purported
beliefs. When approached from this perspective, an amended RFRA
would cover only substantial religious beliefs that are not too attenu-
ated from the statute or regulation being challenged.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in its 2014 decision in Hobby Lobby broadly
expanded so-called religious freedom protections in the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act by striking down a requirement that em-
ployers provide health insurance coverage for certain methods of con-
traception—an issue that had widespread public support and use. In
doing so, it opened the floodgates for employers to claim an exemp-
tion based upon any “sincerely held” religious belief. Without inquiry
into the sincerity of that belief, businesses and corporations are free to
adopt or assert beliefs that could lead to increased discrimination
against employees. This is especially troublesome for marginalized
groups such as the LGBT community, which is already on the receiv-
ing end of discrimination under the pretext of religion. To prevent
future misuse of these exemptions, Congress should amend RFRA so
that courts are permitted to assess the belief being asserted and con-
trast it with the potential harm if an exemption is allowed. In doing so,
RFRA can return to its purpose of protecting religious freedom, while
not being used as a tool to perpetuate discrimination.
